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Abstract 
The article examines the idea of muscular liberalism, first invoked by David Cameron as a paradigm of assertive policy-making in opposition to “state multiculturalism”. The rhetoric of muscular liberalism is present across Western Europe, but its political effects have not been convincingly explored. In scholarship on ethnic minority integration, a “stimulus-response model” credits Muslim intransigence as the trigger for the muscular stance. Other commentators put muscular liberalism into a genealogical perspective, but do little to consider the circumstances of its political deployment. Working towards an alternative account, the article examines two instances of muscular liberalism in Britain: the campaign against “Sharia Courts” and the “Trojan Horse” affair. Different from the concern with historical continuity or stable potentials of liberal normativity, it draws attention to political operations and strategic calculations that characterize the deployment of muscular liberalism in British politics. 
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Introduction 
Coining a theme for his government’s approach towards Islamic extremism, David Cameron 
proclaimed the need for muscular liberalism in February 2011. After several years, an 
election and disputes about integration, education and free speech, it is difficult to see a 
coherent programme that would follow the muscular bent. Policy initiatives in the area of 
“minority integration” convey a sense of vacuity (DCLG 2012; Cameron 2016). The 
government’s message in the aftermath of terrorist incidents appears conflicted (e.g. Pickles 
2015), and the legislative response, leading to the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, 
mired in controversy about the justifiability of measures and their implementation. A recent 
request for Muslim women to improve proficiency in English was framed in terms of 
assertiveness “about our liberal values” (Cameron 2016) in the struggle against Islamic 
extremism. As in other cases, sweeping statements about the defence of liberal values often 
seem disconnected from specific policy measures – here: some adjustments to the spousal 
visa regime – that purport to achieve liberal ends. 
                                                     




The record of muscular liberalism is mixed. The Coalition between Tories and Liberal 
Democrats government has arguably adopted some measures, notably where security 
concerns prevail and when conflicts are framed in civilizational terms, that showcase a 
muscular stance towards British Muslims. After the 2015 election, there are some signs that 
the Conservative government has stiffened its response, with a leading role for security 
agencies even where international or domestic security concerns would seem tenuous (e.g. 
Home Office 2015; Cameron 2016). Yet there is little indication of government’s willingness 
to invest significant resources into muscular policy-making. Rather than part of a coherent 
framework, muscular measures often seem clumsy, contradictory and contested. They are 
usually qualified by references to right-wing extremism and Islamophobia that are said to 
also require monitoring, as well as by a commitment to not criticize or attack “the religion of 
Islam or its followers” (Home Office 2015, 6). The significance of muscular liberalism for the 
British state’s engagement with its Muslim populations is in need of some clarification. 
The concern with this article is to work towards a clearer view. Muscular liberalism may 
have experienced limitations as a result of being caught up in political disputes. It may have 
been qualified where it contradicts non-muscular commitments or fails to attract popular 
support. But irrespective of such limitations, it is uncertain what type of effects we should 
expect muscular liberalism to have, and both mainstream and critical perspectives on the 
Muslim presence in the liberal state have not been particularly helpful in suggesting an 
answer. Two types of responses – discussed here as stimulus-response and liberal genealogy 
– underpin recent scholarship and draw attention to the normative structure of the liberal 
state and historical repertories of liberalism. Taking issue with the neglect of power, interest 
and political positioning in both perspectives, my argument is that muscular liberalism is best 
understood as a matter of politics.  
Two recent episodes in the British state’s engagement with Muslims serve to spell out 
why the absence of politics matters. The first is the attempt by a member of the House of 
Lords, Caroline Cox, to curtail the operation of Islamic arbitration tribunals and mediation 
services (“Sharia Courts”). Drawing on support from pressure groups and in parliament, Cox 




tribunals. With the Coalition government in place until 2015, its adoption seemed unlikely as 
the official commitment to muscular principles, supporters of the bill remarked, left to be 
desired (Cox 2011; Waters 2013). More recently, then-Home Secretary, Theresa May, has 
promised to initiate an investigation into how “Shari’a is being misused and applied in a way 
which is incompatible with the law” (Home Office 2015, 12). 
A second episode that attracted attention in 2014 raises similar questions. In the “Trojan 
Horse” affair, Muslim educationalists stood accused of “infiltrating” Birmingham schools. 
Although charges were revealed to be overblown (see House of Commons 2015, 9-10), they 
did not collapse but shifted from accusations around “extremism” to the claim that 
insufficient attention had been paid to the promotion of “British values”. The sticking point 
became that “children are not being encouraged to develop tolerant attitudes towards all 
faiths and all cultures” (Wilshaw 2014). Cameron (2014) proclaimed the “need to be far more 
muscular in promoting British values” and this request informs a new domain of educational 
monitoring. The promotion of “British values” has since become a vehicle for government’s 
engagement with British Muslims, often by mobilizing subordinate institutional actors that 
assume responsibility for safeguarding and surveillance. 
The episodes provide useful material to explore assumptions about muscular liberalism 
in British politics. After reviewing the relevant rhetoric and commenting on two strands in 
the literature, the article outlines elements of a politically engaged perspective on muscular 
liberalism, which owes to contributions by Bonnie Honig (1993, 2009) and Raymond Geuss 
(2001, 2008). It concludes with a discussion of muscular liberalism in the context of 
normative positions, mediatized representations and political practices that surround the 
presence of Muslim populations in Britain.  
Muscular rhetoric 
In 2011, Cameron delivered a speech on muscular liberalism at the Munich 
Sicherheitskonferenz, an annual meeting of politicians, national security experts and the 
arms industry (Cameron 2011; see Klug (2011) for an excellent rhetorical analysis). The Prime 
Minister set out by announcing that despite cutbacks Britain was not “retreating from an 




“radicalisation” and endorsed the notion of a spectrum of troublesome positions among 
British Muslims, ranging from those who show “real hostility towards Western democracy 
and liberal values” to others who embark on violence. Mirroring the disavowal of retreat in 
global politics, muscular liberalism meant confronting extremism in all its forms. 
Cameron’s other central message was that it had become “hard to identify with Britain 
[…] because we have allowed the weakening of our collective identity”. The “doctrine of state 
multiculturalism” had encouraged segregation and there was no “vision of society” to which 
young Muslims feel they could belong. Minority status and political correctness had shielded 
Muslim communities from criticism for their illiberal practices. Extremist ideologies should 
be confronted and there should be “a clear sense of shared national identity that is open to 
everyone”.  
The speech attracted interest as it seemed to indicate a new approach in the risk 
management of British Muslims. It committed the government to the “conveyer belt” view of 
radicalisation, positing the continuity between “violent extremism” and “non-violent 
extremism”. It seemed to suggest a less cooperative stance towards Muslim organisations 
and hinted at more restrictive policies in the area of minority integration.  
Elements of muscular rhetoric have been present under the previous government 
(McGhee 2010). Labour policy instrument persist, in particular the Prevent agenda of 
counter-extremism that has re-emerged as a vehicle for engaging Muslims in the aftermath 
of the “Trojan Horse” affair. Muscular politics, then, draws on precedents, which does not 
change the fact that it presents itself as a novelty and the departure from “failed policies of 
the past”, collectively captured under the rubric of “state multiculturalism” (Cameron 2011). 
Rhetorically, the Prime Minister’s claim to novelty was borne out by emphasis on gender 
equality, freedom of speech and the rule of law, which he pointed to as principles according 
to which Muslims, individually and collectively, would be judged. The speech offered a more 
direct attempt to specify British national identity by way of a contrast with “radical Islam”. 
While the previous government had also sketched out “Britishness” in relation to alleged 




has become more closely and conditionally linked to a canon of national values (Cameron 
2014). 
Elements in Cameron’s Munich speech, which re-emerge periodically since 2011, bear 
resemblance to high-level rhetoric across Europe that credits liberal timidity and political 
correctness with blame for significant social problems. In the 1990s, the Dutch Premier, Frits 
Bolkestein (1991), demanded “liberalism with guts”. Requests to re-fashion liberalism in 
order to cope with Islamic radicalism have since been a feature of conversations about 
European Muslims. Cameron’s muscular liberalism forms part of a tendency, then, that bears 
out a myriad of speech acts on the place of Muslims in the liberal state. The concerned 
interventions request compliance with liberal values – or at least aim to be reported as such.  
As suggested, there are two frames available for putting muscular liberalism into an 
explanatory perspective: 
A common description credits Muslim intransigence, which is said to bear out to a 
hardline, civic-universalist response. Challenged by far-ranging requests for religious 
accommodation, European states fortify their citizenship regimes and embark on new 
projects of liberal exclusion. Muscular liberalism emerges from within, or at least is a by-
product of, the confrontation between self-doubting liberalism and confident Islam. 
Elements of this position are present in strands of the literature that treat Muslim claims-
making as exceptionally challenging or that review changing national models of minority 
integration, which are said to be uniquely responsive to Muslims’ alleged intransigence.  
A different perspective situates the same transformations among similarly far-ranging 
operations, yet locates these, for example, as part of the “channelling of aversion” (Brown 
2006) in the liberal state. The protection of “dominant liberal norms and values against 
illiberal forms of life” (Lentin and Titley 2011, 88) underpins new projects of exclusion that 
are conducted in a liberal mode and in continuity with older mechanisms of imperial and 
racial ordering.  
The article sets out by questioning the first perspective, which obscures political 




stimuli. By contrast, the second frame – correctly, in my view – draws attention to dynamics 
situated at home: within the liberal state and among its individual and institutional 
proponents. Yet its emphasis on macroscopic analysis makes it less helpful where the 
circumstances of muscular liberalism need to be explored. The perspective developed and 
applied in this article is distinguished by a preference for politics that is missing in both.  
Muslim stimulus/muscular response 
The main argument advanced by supporters of this view is that, after the failure of 
multicultural-corporatist models of minority integration, the Muslim presence poses a 
challenge that culminates in the muscular stance. Accounts of Muslim intransigence, on the 
one hand, and muscular tendencies inherent in liberalism, on the other, both merit more 
detailed scrutiny. The following, however, merely needs to be concerned with explanations 
that draw a connection between the two. 
Echoing a well-known critique of cultural rights, Randall Hansen (2011), for example, 
recommends the “privatization” of difference as the appropriate understanding of the liberal 
tradition. The prescription he endorses is exemplified by two country cases: the United 
States’ commitment to markets and the French insistence on “universal national values” 
(2011, 885). The suggestion that follows is that flexible labour markets and minimal welfare 
regimes incentivize work, prevent dependency, activate minority populations, and in doing so 
outperform their corporatist counterparts. The French case – illustrated by survey data on 
attitudes among European Muslims – is said to show that integration succeeds “when the 
receiving countries have a clear integration framework reflecting confidently held values” 
(2011, 894). 
Hansen pitches his preference for social minimalism and moral republicanism, at least 
where ethnic minority populations are concerned, in relation to one of “two faces of 
liberalism”, the one he associates with “tough love” (2011, 888) rather than liberal 
permissiveness. Problems that become associated with the Muslim presence in Europe are 
accounted for in the terms of a stable antagonism with political liberalism, which becomes an 
explanatory variable in its own right. This antagonism draws on the staging of caricatures on 




attitudes against (Muslim) illiberalism, often by drawing on decontextualized accounts of 
Muslim religiosity and Islam (see also Joppke 2009, Ch. 5; Koopmans 2015). 
For the purpose of my discussion, this caricature is not the only problem. The devil also 
lies in the detail of a definition that sees politics exhausted by the pursuit of normative 
purposes if it requires serious analysis. For Joppke, the label muscular liberalism is reserved 
for measures that go problematically far in demanding adherence to a liberal identity (Joppke 
and Torpey 2013, 153; Joppke, 2014). This would seem to include intrusive lines of 
questioning in citizenship tests or loyalty oaths that are increasingly found at the endpoint of 
naturalization procedures and require aspirants to profess their commitment to a national 
creed. Such attempts are either futile, as they contradict the liberal refusal to monitor 
subjective beliefs or turn out to be marginal, in that the most interesting developments, 
including the “death of multiculturalism” that Joppke has variously invoked, occur outside 
the scope of this definition. 
The logic of stimulus-response coincides with the causal story that underpins the 
rhetoric of muscular liberalism. The “strident statements” of Tariq Ramadan, the scholar of 
European Islam that Joppke (e.g. 2014, 289) frequently cites with disapproval, or the 
“distinctly illiberal leanings of organized Islam” (ibid.) that he sees at work in Britain, are 
among the reasons that, cumulatively, lead to the departure from the “liberal-cum-
multicultural recipe of a ‘passively tolerant society’.” This departure becomes understandable 
as a consequence of the liberal state’s encounter with Muslim intransigence. The political 
change associated with this departure, whether it is defined in the terms of muscular 
liberalism or not, is brought about by the presence of Muslims among which “reverberates 
the archaic power of religion” (Joppke 2009, 111; see also Joppke and Torpey 2013, 153). The 
thickening of liberal precepts, as well as the departure from multiculturalism, become 
understandable in light of this illiberal stimulus. 
Liberal genealogy 
That the muscular phenomenon can be understood as response to the Muslim presence in 
Europe seems doubtful if only for reasons of historical precedent. In the English-speaking 




outsiders. Liberal nativism is neither new nor particularly exceptional, as Hamburger (2002) 
shows for the United States. Elsewhere, the development of exclusionary policies out of 
(alleged) crises of political liberalism draws attention to similar tendencies. In the German 
Kaiserreich, Treitschke (1881, 26) – a leading protagonist of nationalist liberalism – traced 
popular anti-Semitism to Jewish insolence (Frechheit), which had been encouraged by “big 
words about tolerance and Enlightenment”. The illiberal antagonist is a role that has been 
filled out by changing populations and the accusation of liberal permissiveness for 
encouraging unreasonable minority demands is a recurring feature in how minority 
populations have been engaged. 
In Britain, for example, there are parallels between muscular liberalism and articulations 
of a combative disposition in a 19th century context, which have been noticed by scholars 
concerned with muscular liberalism’s genealogy. James Fitzjames Stephen, to select just one 
example, criticized J.S. Mill’s modus vivendi liberalism and achieved some popularity with 
requests for a “vigorous” re-interpretation of liberal ideas to suit the purpose of colonial 
administration. For Stephen – a member of the Colonial Council of India in the 1860s – this 
vigorous alternative was embodied in the suppression of the Indian Mutiny, and the 
endurance of colonials caught up in it. Their conduct served as template for a “‘masculine’ 
conception of liberty – a hardy, strenuous determination to overcome adversity” (Stapleton 
1998, 245). Earlier, Stephen (1862) had set out this meaning of liberalism for the challenge of 
colonial administration: “India is but one instance of the problem which true liberals must 
solve successfully if their success is to be a blessing and not a curse.” The Mutiny, dealing a 
blow to the notion that the British civilizing mission would be easily accomplished, gave the 
occasions for this vigorous re-formulation. It also underpinned the parallel development of a 
“muscular Christianity”, to which van der Veer (2001, 84) refers as the “propagation of manly 
virtues, such as willpower, honor, and courage” in the harnessing of a “national and imperial 
projects”. 
Gilroy (2012, 385) draws attention to this legacy and the “suitably nineteenth-century 
ring” he detects in muscular liberalism. Cameron’s rhetoric “racialises a victorious outcome 
in the civilisational swirl of contending values on which national security depends” (2012, 




liberalism into a particular historical perspective. It points to continuities with “Victorian 
anxieties [that] propelled diverse and often violent projects for controlling the unknown, the 
threatening, and the potentially disruptive” (Hall 2006, 9). This would seem to be confirmed 
by scholars that observe how “discourses of liberalism shape racialized exclusion in a 
postracial socioscape” (Lentin and Titley 2011, 90). 
Genealogies of liberal exclusion challenge the view that a uniquely Muslim stimulus 
would be needed for liberal politics to adopt the muscular mode. But, it appears to me, the 
circumstances of muscular liberalism and its deployment at particular junctures are difficult 
to account for genealogically. The relevant repertories of exclusion, significant as they may 
be, need to be channeled politically to become effective. Both stimulus-response and liberal 
genealogy, which I have only sketched out here in general terms, run into problems for their 
displacement of politics. 
A preference for politics 
The position that I invoke here owes to critical reflections on related themes, notably to 
Bonnie Honig’s (1993, 2008) critique of “virtue theories of politics” and Raymond Geuss’s 
(2001, 2008) rejection of “ethics first”. Geuss (2001, 69) claims that liberalism is by necessity 
“practically engaged, historically located”, with the corollary that its definition will vary in line 
with contextual circumstances and strategic interests underpinning its deployment. In turn, 
Honig (1993, 2) challenges a restricted view of politics that exhausts itself in “juridical, 
administrative, or regulative tasks of stabilizing moral and political subjects, building 
consensus, maintaining agreements, or consolidating communities and identities”.  
For the case at hand, this means that the multiple considerations that are reflected in, 
and impinge upon, political and administrative designs towards Muslims in the UK are 
difficult to put in terms of a coherent ethical orientation. But they are also scarcely possible 
to grasp, as I will suggest in more detail below, through a historicisation that traces 
contemporary responses to continuous repertories of exclusion that now express themselves 
in the terms of muscular liberalism. This does not mean that particular elements or 
rationales, such as a securitarian logic in the UK’s “policed multiculturalism” (Ragazzi 2016), 




an artefact of political struggles that require due attention to “agency, power, and interests 
and the relations among these” (Geuss 2008, 25). 
It is not difficult to see how this position challenges the view that stable commitments to 
liberalism, or to one of two liberal “faces”, could offer a meaningful account of how European 
states engage their Muslim populations. The stimulus-response model suggests that the 
muscular phenomenon can be understood in the context of the liberal state’s ethical 
orientation. It proposes that political change in the form of more assertive civic-universalist 
policies towards Muslims are “driven by the instinct that it is not enough to agree to liberal-
democratic norms only instrumentally” (Joppke 2014, 293). The notion here is that liberalism 
is “offended” by the Muslim presence or that Muslim requests cannot be “processed” 
(Joppke 2009, 109) in the liberal state, which accounts for defence mechanisms that may 
take the rhetorical form of muscular liberalism. 
From this perspective, we would expect stable and continuous pressure where Muslim 
requests are found to clash with liberal norms; a particular emphasis on the normative 
incompatibility of religious requests with liberal constitutionalism; and the mobilization of 
audiences that are noticeably concerned with the integrity of liberal order. Certainly, none of 
these features would need to be present in an undiluted form, but we would at least expect 
to find elements of the relevant logics. The following discussion does not “test” these 
expectations in a narrow sense, but reviews two recent episodes of muscular liberalism to 
shed light on their plausibility and identify alternative logics.  
Sharia Courts 
“Sharia Courts” have been come to be debated in a number of country cases. Despite 
contextual specificity, debates tend to draw on recurring arguments about gender inequality 
and women’s rights, the supremacy of native law as well as the public insecurity associated 
with so-called ethnic enclaves. In the British case, it is usually not the existence of minority 
legal orders, but the terms that are at stake according to which Muslim communities – just 
like other faith groups – may offer dispute resolution in accordance with religious tenets, 
notably in the area of family law. Such mechanisms are available in accordance with the 




two parties that willingly submit to the relevant procedures in civil matters. The Act creates 
the possibility of Muslim arbitration but also applies to Jewish Beth Din, Catholic marriage 
tribunals and various forms of non-religious arbitration (although critics of “Sharia Courts” 
stress that non-Islamic arbitration does not raise similar issues, e.g. Cox 2015, 10, 37). 
The opposition to Muslim mediation and arbitration services, summarily referred to as 
“Sharia Courts”, unites socialist and liberal secularists with mainstream conservatives and 
neo-conservatives, such as the force behind the bill that is of interest here, Caroline Cox. 
Cox’s career included advocacy on disability rights and against the persecution of Christians 
abroad as well as an affiliation with evangelical pressure groups and organisations that aim to 
reveal what they consider to be Islam’s oppressive and violent potentials. She is linked with 
prominent protagonists of the international “counter-jihad” scene, invited Geert Wilders in 
2009 to the House of Lords, and considers Frank Gaffney, a leading figure on the 
international Islamophobic scene, “one of her heroes” (Cox 2011). Such associations have not 
visibly damaged her perception as a genuine voice of women’s rights in the campaign against 
“Sharia Courts”. 
Participants in the coalition that rallied behind Cox’s initiative have relied in particular on 
the widely palatable commitment to the supremacy of native law. “One law for all” was the 
title of a review that the conservative think-tank Civitas, with which Cox is also linked, issued 
in the aftermath of Rowan Williams’ comments on shari’a and English law in 2008. The 
report highlighted three concerns: it mentioned the questionable nature of voluntary 
consent in arbitration. Since there was “a good deal of intimidation of women in Muslim 
communities [..] the genuine consent of women could not be accepted as a reality” (MacEoin 
and Green 2009, 4). Second, it raised the fundamental inequality for women allegedly 
enshrined in the Qur’an and, third, the backdrop of “fear” (either of God or due to “the wish 
to remain in good standing with fellow believers”) that underpins religious authority and that 
make Islam an unsuitable basis for arbitration. 
At the second reading of the bill on 19 October 2012, Cox prefaced her intervention by 
highlighting the two objectives of fighting “religiously sanctioned gender discrimination” and 




1683). With few exceptions, the argument proposed by those in favour of the Act – including 
by Cox herself – made reference to harms that vulnerable women and children would suffer 
as a result of religious arbitration/mediation; to the historical achievements of gender 
equality that “Sharia Courts” risked undercutting; and to the supremacy of British law, which 
needed to be defended against the encroachment of an illiberal legal order. 
These concerns were combined in ways that made them consistent with distinct 
positions. In the case of Labour peers, past struggles for equality formed the background for 
comments by trade unionist peers (e.g. Baroness Donaghy, HL Deb 19 October 2012 c. 1687-
8). Conservatives inserted their positions into a longer horizon of civilizational achievements 
and the development of English liberties. As the sole Liberal Democrat contributing to the 
debate, Lord Carlile (a prominent lawyer) argued that communal morality ought not override 
individual rights (HL Deb 19 October 2012 c.1689). Different from the debate over “Sharia 
Courts” in the Canadian province of Ontario, the inherent harm of group-based expressions 
of “culture” did not feature prominently in this debate. 
Interventions in the parliamentary debate also did not follow the rhetorical tendency of 
indignation that tends to be present when similar themes are articulated elsewhere, notably 
in the press. The terms of parliamentary debate in the House of Lords imposed a filter and 
Cox herself apparently decided to refrain from emphasizing civilizational themes, which she 
clearly espouses in different venues (e.g. Cox 2011), in the interest of building a broad 
coalition. Intolerable harms inflicted upon women and children, as well as the Muslim 
“takeover” of particular social spaces, were thematically present. But the clear majority of 
speakers expressed their concerns in different terms. Only Lord Kalms, a peer with 
inclinations towards UKIP, portrayed the challenge of “Sharia Courts” in terms of a 
civilizational crossroads, with the question “whether this House and this country have any 
confidence in their own values” (HL Deb 19 October 2012 c.1702).  
The government’s response by Lord Gardiner indicated a lack of enthusiasm about the 
entirety of Cox’s bill (HL Deb 19 October 2012 c.1710-4). Dissecting the proposal, Gardiner 
suggested there was no problem requiring legislative remedy. Already now, gender 




had been obtained on the basis of such injustices would be void. Such outcomes, moreover, 
were open to review and a number of domains, including criminal acts and some family 
matters, were and would remain beyond arbitration. Gardiner thus submitted that 
“[i]ncreased awareness requires changes to society, not changes to the law” (HL Deb 19 
October 2012 c.1713). Although Gardiner had to face a number of critical queries from 
speakers that had rallied behind Cox, his response indicated strong reservations towards the 
legislation. 
This unwillingness is difficult to attribute to a principled ethical stance, as the avoidance 
of over-regulation in one specific case seemed to underpin government’s reluctance to 
embrace the legislation. The notion that “Sharia Courts” constitute an offence to liberal 
morality was neither articulated (except for Kalms) nor dismissed, but simply side-lined as 
the relevant actors, such as Gardiner, did not see much benefit in espousing a muscular 
position. The opposition to Muslim arbitration in parliamentary debate also failed to confirm 
stimulus-response expectations. Specific misgivings about tribunals were not couched as 
concerns over the integrity of liberal order, but expressed in terms of particular worries with 
the vulnerability of some Muslim women. They were presented not as a defence of liberal 
civilization, but framed in terms speakers derived from their own particular backgrounds, 
such as trade-unionist commitments. 
After the substantive debate of 2012, governmental reluctance had initially been 
confirmed (e.g. HC Deb 13 April 2013, Column 289WH). More recently, Theresa May has 
commissioned a review into problems with “some Shari’a councils”, suggesting “[w]e will 
never countenance allowing an alternative, informal system of law, informed by religious 
principles, to operate in competition with [English law]” (Home Office 2015, 12). The 
direction of this inquiry and its likely recommendations are (at the time of writing) unclear, 
but its establishment appears to be a concession not to Cox, but to more palatable (and less 
muscular) advocacy groups. What this reveals, though, is that speeches, editorials and 
governmental “command papers” (e.g. Home Office, 2015), which coincide with well-timed 
statements to the press, are more likely to contain elements of muscular rhetoric than can be 




hardly accounts for stable pressure that would lead to muscular policy-making when applied 
to the offending instance. Rather, it appears that political actors and their calculations about 
messages, arenas and audiences determine how much or how little muscular liberalism there 
is. 
The Trojan Horse affair 
The following considers a second case that helps accounting for the muscular phenomenon. 
In the “Trojan Horse” affair, Muslim educationalists in Birmingham stood accused of having 
“infiltrated” state schools as part of an extremist plot. As charges were revealed to lack 
substance, they shifted from the domain of extremism to the failure of promoting “British 
values”. The shift implied that requests for religious accommodation that had previously 
been contested without being denounced as dangerous (such as the Muslim Council of 
Britain’s guidance on Muslim children in state schools, MCB 2007), would now be considered 
as part of “hardline strand of Sunni Islam” and raise “concerns about [children’s] vulnerability 
to radicalisation in the future” (Clarke 2014, 13). 
In this case, the re-appearance of the request for a “more muscular [approach] in 
promoting British values” (Cameron 2014) coincided with new sanctions imposed on 
educationalists and school trusts in Muslim-majority areas. Schools that had previously been 
rated “outstanding” were now considered “inadequate” due to their alleged failure to 
monitor radicalisation and promulgate a newly defined set of British values. Indeed, the head 
of the Ofsted inspectorate, Michael Wilshaw, had remarked in March 2014 that one of the 
concerned schools was “doing fantastically well” (cited in Baxter 2014).  
On one occasion, Ofsted inspectors criticized schools for advocating – rather than 
implementing – “polices [sic] such as single-sex swimming lessons” (Ofsted 2014a, 3). The 
negative grade this school received was further based on the impression that governors were 
not sufficiently versed in the Government's Prevent programme of counter-radicalisation. 
This standard has become widely deployed, including towards a nursery school that caters 
for children up to the age of five (Ofsted 2014b, 3). A number of additional schools were 
criticized for failing to “‘actively promote’ fundamental British values of democracy, the rule 




beliefs” (Ofsted 2014c, 3). This is the line that the Department of Education had issued as its 
first response to the “Trojan Horse” affair and that has since been embraced for the purpose 
of educational monitoring (DfE 2014). 
Among the immediate consequences of the affair is the return to the Prevent 
programme, which has gained new currency under the guise of child safeguarding policies 
(Miah 2014). Moreover, “British values”, which had been the subject of inconclusive public 
consultations in the past, have been rapidly delineated. Finally, Muslim requests for 
educational accommodation have been brought into the domain of dangerous conduct. The 
reference to Britain as a liberal state, and the ad-hoc definition of what this entails, fuses 
with concerns about public security. The existing toolkit of counter-radicalisation, endorsed 
by Cameron (2011) in his Munich speech, has proven capacious enough to encapsulate such 
concerns and to allow a shift from general muscular rhetoric towards the deployment of 
muscular procedures in Birmingham and across the British educational sector. 
This is exemplified in the major report into the case for which the Department of 
Education commissioned Peter Clarke, the former head of counter-terrorism at the 
Metropolitan Police. Clarke (2014, 12) committed himself to applying the “spectrum of 
extremism described by the Prime Minister in his Munich speech in February 2011”. 
Acknowledging patchy evidence, he upheld the view that there had been a conspiracy led by 
“a number of people, associated with each other and in positions of influence in schools and 
governing bodies, who espouse, endorse or fail to challenge extremist views” (2014, 12). 
Regarding the field of education, he applied this spectrum – espousing, endorsing or failing 
to challenge – to delineate new standards of judgment. The failure to “challenge extremist 
views” (Clarke 2014, 12), for example, could be substantiated with evidence such as the 
aforementioned preference for single-sex swimming lessons. Clarke (2014, 13, 52, 95) put 
considerable emphasis on the risk of “narrowing” the curriculum that made it harder for 
pupils to “question or challenge radical influences” (2014, 96). Even if this did not represent a 
direct “infiltration”, the attempt to expand the scope of religion in school life needed to be 
rejected as it represented an “intolerant and politicized form of extreme social conservatism 




constituted an “Islamizing blueprint” (Clarke 2014, 50) that would have to be faced off not 
simply for its offense to liberal values but for the risk to domestic security. 
The Clarke report followed narrowly, and quoted extensively, the rhetorical emphasis 
that Cameron had set in 2011, which does not mean that it has gone undisputed (see, for 
example, House of Commons 2015). Its findings have been endorsed by the Home Office 
(2015, 13-14) and appear to capture a popular narrative on “radicalization” in Birmingham 
schools. This narrative now underpins a system of muscular intervention, which makes 
schools, universities, local authorities and even hospitals responsible for practices of 
surveillance and the promulgation of British values.  
Whilst the public negotiation of “Sharia Courts” points to the significance of political 
communication, the “Trojan Horse” affair draws additional attention to circumstances of 
governance. The translation of muscular rhetoric into muscular politics apparently varies, not 
least depending on policy tools that are available for putting securitarian rhetoric into 
political practice. The “Trojan Horse” case was amenable to a default mode of engaging 
social issues, often propagated as a form of participatory governance, but more suitably 
described as an authoritarian form of network governance, concerned, in this case, with the 
production of “stakeholder security” (Jarvis and Lister 2010). In education, existing 
monitoring regimes have been reinforced that delegate responsibility to detect signs of 
“radicalisation” to a variety of subordinate actors, which also draws attention to a contrast 
between the two cases presented here. Depending on the outcome of the ongoing inquiry, 
the regulation of “Sharia Courts” is likely to necessitate either more direct lines of regulatory 
responsibility or additional engagement with Muslim faith actors, for which the current 
government has little appetite. In its response to the “Trojan Horse” case, by contrast, 
government could abstain from direct interference in favour of loosely operationalizing 
ambiguous standards around “British values”. This creates the scope for regulation in which 
muscular rhetoric, rather than underpinning a programme of direct governmental 
intervention, informs standards of compliance. 
The “Trojan Horse” episode highlights political and institutional conditions for muscular 




policy making where hands-off arrangements are absent, i.e. where measures require 
implementation in a “command and control” mode, rather than through the 
responsibilization of subordinate actors and institutions. As in the previous episode, this does 
not mean that the impact of muscular liberalism is more limited than assumed; after all, the 
relevant mechanisms of hands-off governance are, if anything, expanding. But it puts into 
perspective the claim that stable potentials of liberalism, rather than circumstances of 
politics, require particular attention. 
The politics of muscular liberalism 
The shape of governance arrangements that facilitate the implementation of muscular 
policies thus requires attention as do political arenas into which muscular message are 
released. The point in the following is to accentuate this role of politics, extend the critique 
of stimulus-response to liberal genealogy, and flesh out two provisional avenues for political 
analysis. 
To recapitulate, the stimulus-response model draws a connection between the Muslim 
presence and muscular policies, pointing to liberal normativity (and how it is offended by 
Islam) as a crucial explanatory resource. The position informs distinct contributions, such as 
Joppke’s (2010, 138) observation that “in the wake of Islamic terrorism, toleration liberalism 
has receded behind a less procedural, more substantive variant of liberalism” or Hansen’s 
(2011, 888) prescription of “tough love”, which additionally recommends restrictions to 
welfare provision. The position channels, and is often close to endorsing, key elements of 
muscular liberalism in political rhetoric, in particular an account of how “state 
multiculturalism” and “passive tolerance” underpin historical failures of minority integration. 
The problem with this position is the staging of caricatures on both sides: 
decontextualized Muslims enter the stage as the civilizational others against which models of 
European liberalism can be defined and defended. I have not engaged with such sweeping 
accounts of Muslim antagonism here, but simply pointed to the mystification of liberalism in 
stimulus-response scholarship. Alternative approaches are available that unsettle liberal 
ideas, situate them historically and politically, and explore how liberal meaning can be 




confirms this alternative, pointing to the malleability of normative ideas, when he suggests 
that liberalism provides a “vocabulary [that] can cover a multitude of sins – and virtues.” 
Yet scholars in genealogical vein, including Asad, encounter problems that are not 
dissimilar. The proposal here is, for example, that “the liberal must continually attack the 
darkness of the outside world that threatens to overwhelm that [liberal] space” (Asad 2003, 
59). Although it is certainly the case that a liberal vocabulary can provide resources for this 
attack, the liberal dictionary itself is not fixed. Genealogical approaches, which situate 
muscular liberalism among a history of responses to “difference” in the liberal state and draw 
particular attention to colonial legacies, also point towards stable mechanisms underpinning 
liberal politics. As argued previously, such perspectives need to be complemented with an 
interest in political circumstances to avoid the reification that is characteristic for the 
stimulus-response model. 
The semantic flexibility of liberalism and its context-dependence, then, can be the 
starting point for a study of muscular liberalism that pays attention to circumstances of 
muscular politics. I have previously drawn attention to circumstances of communication and 
governance as two areas of concern without which British muscular liberalism would appear 
difficult to capture. 
Regarding communication, the political message that underpins the rhetoric of muscular 
liberalism in Britain is characterized by persistent references to the failure of past approaches 
of minority integration. This reference is partially diagnostic, partially strategic, as it singles 
out antagonists that are assigned responsibility, such as Labour’s disastrous commitment to 
laissez-faire multiculturalism. The consequences of this failure form part of a contrast with a 
vision of restored national unity. The Home Office (2015, 7) thus suggests where “non-violent 
extremism goes unchallenged, the values that bind our society together fragment”. Cameron 
(2016), reiterating his Munich message, argues that “[i]t’s our values that make this country 
what it is, and it’s only by standing up for them assertively that they will endure.” The 
rhetoric of muscular liberalism is characterized by this type of fantasmatic contrast where a 
“horrific dimension” of social disintegration connects with utopian counterpoints and a 




2007, 147). The urgency of muscular rhetoric, then, relies on how the two are brought 
together: images of social breakdown and disintegration connect to a promise of wholesome 
national unity. In this vein, the muscular position offers an account of failures and the 
promise of restoration that stresses the need to overcome constraints – liberal, legal and 
procedural, derived from excessive cultural sensitivity and the all-pervasive theme of 
“political correctness”. The understanding is that constraints have to be vanquished, taboos 
broken, values asserted and sovereign control reestablished. On the basis of these elements, 
the muscular position promises the release from burdens and the unleashing of national 
energies. 
Yet the appeal of this type of muscular communication is likely to vary and muscular 
messages will be modulated with a view to particular audiences – ramped up, toned down, 
or replaced with something else, as the mobilization against “Sharia Courts” shows. There 
are also no good reasons to believe that full-fledged muscular rhetoric will always translate 
into specific forms of muscular policy-making, and the “Trojan Horse” case points to the 
dependence of muscular politics on specific governance arrangements. Arguably, 
arrangements that place the burden of implementation onto subordinate actors are 
particularly conducive for muscular rhetoric to impact on political practice, at least in the 
context of contemporary British politics. This corresponds to a mode of governance as “story-
telling”, where the aim is to shape “the meanings and identities that constitute self-
governing actors” (Sørensen 2006, 101; see also Dobbernack 2014, 55-56), although there is 
an authoritarian bent to arrangements that tend to be backed up by the possibility of a 
“crackdown” if ambiguous standards fail to be met. In summary, the rhetorical substance of 
muscular liberalism, and how it is tailored to particular audiences, requires attention 
alongside the governance arrangements that facilitate or impede its implementation. 
Conclusion  
The aim with this article has been to cast doubt on the notion, which informs different 
strands of scholarship, that muscular liberalism could be understood with reference to stable 
normative potentials or historical repertories of exclusion. My claim is that politics matters 




muscular liberalism, in turn, are open to a variety of explanatory approaches, and this article 
merely draws attention to elements of an alternative. The mobilization against “Sharia 
Courts” illustrates how muscular messages are tailored to relevant audiences. The “Trojan 
Horse” case provides a case in point for the importance of governing arrangements that help 
explain where muscular rhetoric is more or less likely to underpin muscular policy-making. 
These perspectives do not exhaust the phenomenon, which is likely to require not one, but a 
multiplicity of approaches that situate conceptions of liberalism in concrete political and 
historical circumstances. 
There is a wider point to make about the displacement of politics in scholarship on 
ethnic minority integration in “the liberal state”. The mystification of liberalism in literatures 
that fixate on normative dispositions at the expense of political operations is unhelpful. 
Beliefs that agents hold, normative or otherwise, matter. But they do not yield effects that 
could be understood independently from the study of “agency, power, and interests” (Geuss 
2008, 25). In the same vein, liberalism is not merely a domain of historically predetermined 
patterns but requires the study of contemporary “wars of position”. The advantage with this 
perspective, which owes more to Gramsci (1992, 219) than to either Rawls or Foucault, is 
that it brings multiple potentials into view. As Honig (2009, 81) suggests, these will include 
tendencies that are “demonological and inclusive, particularistic and universalistic, 
securitarian and willing to take risks”. Acknowledging this multiplicity does not mean 
minimizing the securitarian streak that distinguishes muscular liberalism, but provides better 
means for challenging it.
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